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Ask most philosophers for an example of a moral rationalist, and they will 
probably answer “Kant.”  And no wonder.  Kant’s first great work of moral philosophy, 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, opens with a clarion call for rationalism, 
proclaiming the “necessity to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, completely 
cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to anthropology” (G 
4:389).  Such a “metaphysics of morals,” as Kant calls it, is the indispensable foundation 
of ethics, understood as a system of laws or duties.  It is not that empirical and 
anthropological considerations play no role in ethics; he does after all speak of an 
empirical counterpart of metaphysics, under the name “practical anthropology.”  It is 
just that these considerations play no role in the foundations of ethics, no role in 
establishing the system of laws or duties.  Or so it has seemed. 
Recent commentators have by and large resisted this austerely rationalist reading 
of Kant.  Of course, they say, the moral law, the first principle of ethics, must be pure.  
But it does not follow from this that more particular laws, the second principles of 
ethics—e.g., duties of truthfulness, beneficence, etc.—must be pure as well. ⁠1 Indeed, 
though Kant doesn’t really argue for such principles in the Groundwork, what little he 
does say there about them suggests that they do make essential use of empirical and 
anthropological considerations.  For instance, his discussion of the famous four 
examples following the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative clearly 
relies not just on the empirical particularity of the agent’s maxim but also on general 
features of human nature, such as material dependence.  We cannot know what the 
principle means for us without knowing something about us. 
Now, one might say that this just shows that the second principles cannot belong 
to metaphysics.  After all, metaphysics is pure and these principles are not.  But this is 
too quick.  For one, if they do not belong to metaphysics, then it seems they should 
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belong to practical anthropology.  But they do not belong to practical anthropology, 
since Kant is clear that the business of such anthropology is not to establish moral laws 
but to implement them, to make them “effective in concreto in the conduct of [our] lives” 
(G 4:389).  Moreover, when one looks beyond the Groundwork to the work it grounds, 
the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant seems to say outright that the second principles belong 
to metaphysics, the consequence of showing what in “the particular nature of human 
beings, which is cognized only empirically,…can be inferred from universal moral 
principles” (MS 6:217).  Indeed, if they did not so belong, then that work, the aim of 
which is clearly to argue for such principles, is horribly misnamed.   
The issue is not merely terminological.  It matters quite a lot whether the second 
principles really belong to metaphysics or not, since to call them “metaphysical” is not 
merely to label them but to assert their position in a particular philosophical enterprise.  
We have not appreciated this point because we have not paid sufficient attention to 
Kant’s claim that the metaphysics of morals is the practical counterpart of the 
metaphysics of nature (MS 6:205, 6:216-217).  In making this claim, Kant is not simply 
telling us that practical philosophy, no less than theoretical philosophy, must have a 
priori foundations underwriting its laws.  He is telling us something very specific about 
how these foundations are to be understood and so the relevant laws established.  Qua 
metaphysics, both of these parts of philosophy employ a common methodology, a 
methodology that generates significant parallels in both form and content.  In 
particular, metaphysics in general has two ordered parts: the first, which is wholly a 
priori, setting the stage for the second, which is partly empirical.  If this is right, then it 
is not just the case that the metaphysics of morals does encompass second principles.  It 
must.  For the provision of such principles, impure though they are, is in fact the very 
point of metaphysics.2  
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As I shall explain, taking the metaphysics of the metaphysics of morals in this 
way seriously sheds significant light on the foundations of Kantian ethics.  First, as I 
have already suggested, bringing the second principles into the remit of metaphysics 
tells us something important and perhaps surprising about how they are to be 
established.  In particular, it tells us that the way to establish these principles is not, as 
many have thought, by subjecting maxims to a Categorical Imperative test but by 
providing an anthropocentric specification of generically rational ends.  Second, it 
deepens our understanding of the rationalist character of Kantian ethics, and this in two 
ways.  On the one hand, it seems to attenuate his rationalism, insofar as it makes 
empirical considerations essential aspects of the metaphysical foundations of ethics.  
But on the other hand, it seems to accentuate his rationalism, insofar as the fact that 
empirical considerations enter only at the second stage of metaphysics implies that only 
certain kinds of empirical considerations are relevant.  Since, as I have already 
suggested, these considerations are paradigmatically anthropological, it is a 
consequence of this that our a priori concept of rational nature, as it figures in the first 
stage, in fact constrains our empirical concept of human nature, as it figures in the 
second.  In this way, by illuminating the Kantian conception of metaphysics, we also 
and thereby illuminate the Kantian conception of ourselves. 
 
I 
I begin with the Groundwork, in which Kant first introduces his conception of 
ethics.  As I have already suggested, it is the resolute rationalism of the Groundwork that 
lends support to the view that metaphysics must be pure.  It will be important, then, to 
say how I understand what Kant is claiming here and, more importantly, what he is 
not. 
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The key text is the Preface.  Kant begins the Preface with a broad taxonomy of 
philosophy, endorsing the Ancient division of the field into the three sciences of 
physics, ethics, and logic.  Logic, he says, is merely formal philosophy, insofar it 
concerns “the universal rules of thinking in general, without distinction of objects” (G 
4:387). Physics and ethics are material philosophies, insofar as they are concerned with 
“determinate objects and the laws to which they are subject” (ibid.)  The former is 
concerned with nature and its laws; the latter is concerned with freedom—that is, free 
action—and its laws. 
Since logic concerns only the laws of thought as such, it is wholly a priori.  Since 
physics and ethics concern the objects of thought and their laws, they have both a priori 
and empirical parts.  The a priori part he calls “metaphysics,” and he distinguishes a 
metaphysics proper to physics—a metaphysics of nature—and a metaphysics proper to 
ethics—a metaphysics of morals.  The empirical part lacks a common name.  On the 
theoretical side, he simply refers to empirical physics, and on the practical side, he 
speaks of something he calls “practical anthropology.” 
In both cases, Kant is clear, the a priori must precede the empirical.  He is rather 
less clear, though, about why.  That said, I think we can infer Kant’s reason from his 
argument that there must be such a metaphysics in the first place.  In both cases the 
leading thought is familiar: laws are necessary and universal; necessity and universality 
demand a priori grounds; so, where there are laws, there must be a priori grounds.3  
Thus, if ethics, no less than physics, is concerned with determinate objects and the laws 
to which they are subject, then ethics, no less than physics, requires metaphysical 
foundations.4       
Now, it is natural to suppose that by identifying metaphysics as the a priori part 
of ethics, Kant intends this metaphysics to be wholly a priori, such that not only are its 
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principles a priori but all the concepts that figure in them are a priori as well; in the 
terms that Kant introduces in the B-edition of the first Critique, they are “pure a priori” 
(KrV B3).  So much seems suggested by Kant’s repeated remarks that the metaphysics of 
morals must be “cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs to 
anthropology (G 4:389),” as well as his claim that the ground of obligation he seeks 
“must not be sought in the nature of the human being or in the circumstances of the 
world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in concepts of pure reason” (ibid.).  
Indeed, throughout the Groundwork Kant is extremely anxious about (and frequently 
admonishes against) allowing anything empirical to enter his argument at all.  This is 
not to say, of course, that the empirical has no role to play in ethics.  It is just to say that 
it has no role to play in the metaphysics of ethics.  Once this metaphysics is complete, 
experience can enter in the guise of practical anthropology, the main concern of which 
seems to be the implementation of moral laws, already established, in human beings, 
who do not do what they ought simply because they ought.   
Again, this a natural supposition.  But it is mistaken.  Kant’s comments about the 
purity of metaphysics, so clear at the beginning of the Preface, must be read in light of a 
distinction he makes within metaphysics at the end of the Preface.  For though Kant 
often speaks of the metaphysics of morals as a singular, unitary thing, it is clear that he 
thinks of this metaphysics as proceeding in two distinct stages.   In the first stage, the 
focus is exclusively on the identification and justification of the supreme principle of 
morality, the first principle of ethics.  In the second stage, the focus is on the application 
of this principle, and so the transition from the first to the second principles of ethics, 
the system of particular laws and duties that constitute the substance of the science.  As 
Kant makes clear, his ambition in the Groundwork is simply to execute the first stage.  
The second is deferred to a future work—presumably, to the work the Groundwork 
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grounds, the Metaphysics of Morals.   
It is clear enough that empirical, anthropological considerations play no role in 
the first stage of metaphysics.  Since Kant believes that the supreme principle of 
morality, the moral law, holds for all rational beings as such, it must be grounded in 
rational nature as such, which can only be cognized a priori.  To this extent, Kant’s 
cleansing claim seems apt; if the point is to search for and establish this principle, 
empirical, anthropological considerations really are irrelevant.  But what about the 
second stage?  Are empirical, anthropological considerations relevant to the application 
of the law, to the transition from the first to the second principles of ethics, and so to the 
determination of moral laws and duties?  Must this second stage be cleansed too? 
Again, to be clear, the kind of application at issue here is internal rather than 
external to metaphysics.  In particular, it is not the kind of application Kant assigns to 
the empirical counterpart of metaphysics, practical anthropology, which he does 
sometimes characterize as applied moral philosophy.5  That empirical, anthropological 
considerations are relevant here is obvious.  My question, though, is: are they also 
relevant to the metaphysical application that this non-metaphysical application 
presupposes, one that concerns the laws themselves and not simply the conditions of 
their implementation?6  And my answer is: the Groundwork doesn’t rule it out; and 
when we look past the Groundwork, to the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant in fact rules it in, 
that is, he affirms it.    
The main point is this.  Kant tells us next to nothing in the Groundwork about how 
this second stage of metaphysics is to proceed.  His focus is exclusively on the first 
stage.  Indeed, he is explicit that he will forgo the advantages to be gained from “the 
application of the [supreme] principle to the whole system,” focusing instead on 
“rigorously investigating and weighing it in itself and without any regard for what 
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follows from it” (G 4:392).  Again, given the narrowness of Kant’s concern, his anxiety 
about the empirical and anthropological makes perfect sense. For such considerations 
really are irrelevant at best and ruinous at worst with respect to the task he has set 
himself.  But it does not follow from this that once we shift our focus to the second 
stage, to the application that Kant has here forgone, that this irrelevance or ruinousness 
still holds.  So far as I can see, then, for all Kant has said in the Groundwork, it could well 
be the case that empirical, anthropological considerations are not simply not irrelevant 
or ruinous but are indeed essential to the completion of the second stage of 
metaphysics.  And this, I think, is just what we find when we leave the Groundwork and 
turn to the Metaphysics of Morals.   
 
II 
 For our purposes, the key discussion in the Metaphysics of Morals is the first 
section of the Introduction.  Kant begins as he does in the Groundwork, by drawing 
parallels between theoretical and practical philosophies.  Just as natural laws must be 
grounded in a system of a priori principles, a metaphysical science of nature, so must 
moral laws be grounded in a system of a priori principles, a metaphysical science of 
morals—and for the very same reason, viz., they concern laws.  But he ventures into 
new territory when he begins to detail, in a way he does not in the Groundwork, the 
structure of this metaphysics.  For immediately after asserting that there must be a 
metaphysics of morals, on a par with a metaphysics of nature, he adds the following, 
important qualification: 
But just as there must be principles in a metaphysics of nature for 
applying those highest universal principles of a nature in general to 
objects of experience, a metaphysics of morals cannot dispense with 
principles of application, and we shall often have to take as our object the 
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particular nature of human beings, which is cognized only by experience, 
in order to show in it what can be inferred from universal moral principles.  
But this will in no way detract from the purity of these principles or cast 
doubt on their a priori source (MS 6:216-7, Kant’s emphasis). 
 If one comes to the Metaphysics of Morals acquainted only with the Groundwork, 
this remark may seem quite surprising—indeed, profoundly un-Kantian.  For instead of 
his usual admonitions against letting the empirical into the metaphysical, Kant here 
seems to be cautioning against leaving the empirical out of the metaphysical.  The threat 
isn’t illicit impurity.  The threat is illicit purity.   To be sure, there is still a part of 
metaphysics that is pure: the part that provides the aforementioned universal moral 
principles, represented presumably by the various formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative.  But Kant here seems to countenance another part of metaphysics, one that 
is impure: a metaphysics that takes those universal principles, applies them to the 
human case, and yields non-universal principles, determining distinctively human 
duties. 
 Now, one might doubt that Kant is really saying this.  Perhaps by speaking here 
of application, Kant is signaling a shift away from metaphysics, in one of two ways.  
First, and most obviously, one might think that the application Kant has in mind is not 
metaphysical but anthropological.   Indeed, immediately after this passage, Kant says 
“[t]his is to say, in effect, that a metaphysics of morals cannot be based on anthropology 
but can still be applied to it,” a remark he follows by introducing “the counterpart of a 
metaphysics of morals,” which he now identifies as “moral” rather than “practical” 
anthropology, and which “deal[s] only with the subjective conditions in human nature 
that hinder people or help them in fulfilling the laws of a metaphysics of morals” (MS 
6:217, Kant’s emphasis).   
 Second, one might concede that the application in question is not 
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anthropological, while at the same time denying that it is metaphysical.  Since the 
determination of duties is at issue, and not just the conditions of their fulfillment, it falls 
outside the scope of anthropology.  But since the duties in question are distinctively 
human duties, and so must take account of distinctively human beings, which we 
cognize by experience, it falls outside the scope of metaphysics. 7 
 I don’t think either of these readings can be right.  The reason is that, as we saw 
in our discussion of the Groundwork, not all application is external to metaphysics.  There 
is also a kind of application internal to metaphysics, one that effects the transition from 
the first to the second principles of ethics.  And it is this kind of application, I suggest, 
that is at issue in this passage.  We transition from the first to the second principles of 
ethics by applying the first principle, which holds of all rational beings, to a specific 
kind of rational being—in this case, the human being.  The descent from the rational to 
the human, then, is a move within a metaphysical argument.  It does not force us out of 
metaphysics.  It just forces us from the first stage to the second.   
 While I think this is what a straightforward reading of the passage suggests, the 
strongest evidence in its favor is the analogy Kant explicitly draws between the 
theoretical and practical cases.  For in the theoretical case, it is very clear that the 
application he has in mind—one in which the highest universal principles of a nature in 
general are applied to objects of experience—is one that occurs within metaphysics itself.  
So, if the metaphysics of morals is structured in the same way as the metaphysics of 
nature, as Kant is plainly inviting us here to think, then there should be no doubt that 
the partly empirical, impure metaphysics that Kant countenances in the former should 
have its analog in the latter.   
 What I propose to do next, then, is to discuss the relevant parts of Kant’s 
metaphysics of nature, as articulated in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, 
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the work that Kant explicitly identifies as the theoretical counterpart of the Metaphysics 
of Morals (MS 6:205).  Since I think Kant is actually much more explicit in the 
Metaphysical Foundations than in the Metaphysics of Morals about his methodology, Kant’s 
procedure in the former will provide us a model for understanding his procedure in the 
latter.   
 
III 
 I turn, then, to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.  The main text for 
us is the Preface, in which Kant lays out the project of the book.  As usual, Kant begins 
by identifying his quarry; natural science is a science of nature, understood as “the sum 
total of all things, insofar as they can be objects of our senses, and thus also of 
experience” (MAN 4:467).  And as usual, he insists that such a science requires 
metaphysical foundations.    What is most significant for present purposes, however, is 
Kant’s elaboration of the structure of these foundations.  The key passage is this:   
 
[The metaphysics of nature] must always contain solely principles that are 
not empirical (for precisely this reason it bears the name of a 
metaphysics), but it can still either: first, treat the laws that make possible 
the concept of a nature in general, even without relation to any 
determinate object of experience, and thus undetermined with respect to 
the nature of this or that thing in the sensible world; in which case, it is the 
transcendental part of the metaphysics of nature; or, second, concern itself 
with a particular nature of this or that kind of thing, for which an 
empirical concept is given, but still in a manner that, outside of what lies 
in this concept, no other empirical principle is used for its cognition (for 
example, it takes the empirical concept of matter or of a thinking thing as 
its basis, and it seeks that sphere of cognition of which reason is capable a 
priori concerning these objects), and here such a science must still always 
be called a metaphysics of nature, namely, of corporeal or of thinking 
nature.  However [in this second case] it is then not a general but a special 
metaphysical natural science (physics or psychology), in which the above 
12 
transcendental principles are applied to the two species of objects of our 
senses (MAN 4:469-70; translator’s interpolation, Kant’s emphasis). 
 
This is an extremely difficult and dense passage, even by Kantian standards, but it 
clearly makes two important points.8  First, the metaphysics of nature has two parts: a 
general, transcendental part and a special part.  Second, while general metaphysics is 
purely a priori, special metaphysics is not.  That is to say, though special metaphysics is 
still metaphysics, and thus a priori, it is not wholly a priori.  It is partly empirical.  
 Start with the transcendental or general metaphysics of nature.  This concerns the 
laws that make possible the concept of a nature in general, even without relation to any 
determinate object of experience.  It is clear, I think, that these laws of a nature in 
general are the laws that Kant articulates in the first Critique—in particular, the laws of 
the Analytic of the Transcendental Logic.  Such laws, represented by the categories and 
their correlative principles, provide an account of, as Kant puts in the Critique, an object 
in general.  They do not tell us anything about the particular objects that populate 
nature.  They merely lay down formal, or constitutive, conditions for being an object, 
and so of belonging to nature, considered as a whole.  So, for example, Kant thinks, 
without knowing anything about what objects are in nature—whether, say, they are all 
material or not—we can and do know that those objects must be substances standing in 
reciprocal causal relations with one another, viz., the three Analogies of Experience. 
 In addition to this general metaphysics of nature, however, there is also a special 
metaphysics of nature.  Where general metaphysics concerns the laws of a nature in 
general, special metaphysics concerns the laws of a particular kind of natural object.  
Thus, special metaphysics requires that we move beyond pure concepts, which leave 
the (kind of) object undetermined, to an empirical concept, which determines the (kind 
of) object.  Nonetheless, Kant is clear, in order to retain the status of metaphysics, this 
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special science must restrict itself to a priori cognition of this empirically determined 
object.  More specifically, it must restrict itself to what can be cognized simply through 
the application of the laws of general metaphysics to the relevant empirical concept.  So, 
though special metaphysics does go beyond general metaphysics, it nonetheless 
presupposes it.  For only then, Kant thinks, can we arrive at an account of genuine laws, 
albeit ones that are less than fully general, since they do not govern all natural objects, 
considered as such, but only a particular kind of natural object, though still considered 
as such.   
 Now, Kant offers two examples of a possible special metaphysics of nature, 
corresponding to two empirical concepts of two kinds of natural objects: matter (the 
generic object of outer sense) and a thinking being (the generic object of inner sense).  
But, for reasons beyond the scope of this paper, he thinks that only the first 
metaphysics—a “metaphysics of corporeal nature,” as he calls it—is actual.  What he 
endeavors to do in the rest of the book, then, is to provide just such a metaphysics, and 
in just the way we should expect given what I have said.  That is to say, he brings “all 
determinations of the general concept of a matter in general” under “the four classes of 
[pure concepts of the understanding],” which he expounds in the first Critique, from 
which we learn “all that may be either thought a priori in this concept, or presented in 
mathematical construction, or given as a determinate object of experience” (MAN 4:474-
5, translator’s interpolation).   
 So, for example, just as the Analogies of Experience in the first Critique tell us 
what follows from the application of the categories of relation—substance, cause, and 
community—to the concept of an object of possible experience, so does Kant, in the 
Mechanics section of the Metaphysical Foundations, tell us what follows from the 
application of these same categories, and their correlative principles, to the concept of 
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matter, viz., the three Laws of Mechanics, very roughly, Kant’s version of Newton’s 
Laws.9  Thus, special metaphysical laws, like the Laws of Mechanics, realize or 
instantiate the general metaphysical laws, like the Analogies of Experience, in the 
material world.  They characterize the nature and so behavior of specifically material 
substances, endowed with specifically material powers, exercised reciprocally with 
other such substances: laws not of nature in general but of material, corporeal nature in 
general.  
 In the theoretical case, then, Kant seems fully committed to the view that 
metaphysics, though a priori, need not be cleansed of everything empirical; general 
metaphysics is, but special metaphysics is not.  Nor does this seem to be something he 
tries on here and casts aside.  It is clearly in evidence in the B-edition of the first 
Critique, published a year after the Metaphysical Foundations: both in his first explicit 
statement of the distinction between pure and impure a priori cognitions (KrV B3), as 
well as his offering the Laws of Mechanics rather than the Analogies of Experience as 
paradigms of the “pure natural science” he intends there to investigate (KrV B17-18, 
B20-21).  That is to say, in asking in the Critique after the possibility of synthetic a priori 
theoretical cognition, he is asking (at least in significant part) after the possibility of 
impure, special metaphysics rather than its pure, general counterpart.  This, it now 
seems, is his real quarry. 
 This centering of impure, special metaphysics is also clear in the third Critique, 
where Kant goes so far as to restrict the designation “metaphysical” to just this case.  He 
says,  
A transcendental principle is one through which the universal a priori 
condition under which alone things can become objects of our cognition at 
all is represented.  By contrast, a metaphysical principle is one that 
represents the a priori condition under which alone objects whose concept 
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must be given empirically can be further determined a priori (KU 5:181). 
Notably, he goes on to offer an example, identifying as a transcendental principle, what 
is in effect the Second Analogy, and identifying as a metaphysical principle, what is in 
effect the Second Law of Mechanics.  Here, then, at least, Kant seems to think that it is 
only the special metaphysics that is properly metaphysical.  The general metaphysics, as 
transcendental philosophy, seems merely a prelude.   
 Though Kant is not always so restrictive in his use of the term “metaphysics,” of 
course, his inclination to be so here is telling.  For it reflects, I think, his apparent view 
that though general metaphysics must precede special metaphysics, there is an 
important sense in which the true telos, so to speak, of metaphysics is found only in the 
latter. 10 After all, general metaphysics tells us that nature is a lawful order, and so 
amendable to scientific investigation.  But it does not yet tell us what this order is.  It 
tells us, among other things, that natural objects are substances standing in reciprocal 
causal relations.  But it does not yet tell us which substances or which relations.   In 
order to cognize these further things—that is, in order to cognize not just the lawfulness 
of nature but nature’s laws—we must supplement the purely a priori general 
metaphysics with an impurely a priori special one, realizing or instantiating the former 
in the latter.  It is here, and only here, Kant thinks, that we move beyond the possibility 
of natural science to its actual practice. 
 
IV 
Return, then, to the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals.  Though Kant does 
not use the same language there as he uses in the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations, 
I think he is clearly signaling that the structure of the metaphysics articulated in the 
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former work mirrors the structure of the metaphysics articulated in the latter.  That is to 
say, there is a general metaphysics of morals that lays out universal moral principles, 
which govern free action in general; as well as a special metaphysics of morals that takes 
those universal moral principles, applies them to an empirical concept of a particular kind 
of action, and lays out laws governing that kind of action in general.11  Again, while the 
general metaphysics is wholly a priori, the special metaphysics is not, since it makes 
essential use of an empirical concept, viz., human action.12  The result is an impurely a 
priori metaphysics of morals, one that tells us all we can know a priori about human 
morality: the laws of human action in general. 
 If this is right, then it is clear that the account of the metaphysics of morals 
provided in the Metaphysics of Morals is quite different from that typically drawn from the 
Groundwork.  For it is clear here, even if it was not there, that the metaphysics of morals 
is not and cannot be “cleansed of everything that may be only empirical and that belongs 
to anthropology” (G 4:389).  On the contrary, Kant insists here on a role for empirical, 
anthropological considerations within the scope of metaphysics itself and not merely in the 
application of a completed metaphysics to the special case of human beings. 
 Again, I don’t think this is necessarily at odds with the Groundwork.  If one maps 
the Metaphysics of Morals’ distinction between general and special metaphysics onto the 
Groundwork’s distinction between the stage of metaphysics that provides the first 
principle of ethics and the stage of metaphysics that provides the second, there need be 
no contradiction at all.  For, we can now see, in providing the first principle of ethics, 
the moral law, the Groundwork is simply executing the pure, general metaphysics of 
morals—in which case Kant’s cleansing claim makes perfect sense.13  But this kind of 
metaphysics must be supplemented by another, an impure and special metaphysics that 
effects the transition from the first to the second principles by applying the first 
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principle to an empirical concept of human action.  This is the task of the Metaphysics of 
Morals.   
Thus, we can understand the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals as 
complementary in exactly the way that the first Critique and the Metaphysical 
Foundations are complementary.  The metaphysical project initiated in the former is 
completed only in the latter. 
 Consequently, I think we can conclude, as we did in the theoretical case, that 
though the general metaphysics must precede the special metaphysics, the true telos of 
this metaphysics is found only in the latter.14   For, again, the general metaphysics, in 
effect, tells us that the object of the science is a lawful order and so amenable to 
scientific investigation.  But it does not tell us what this order is.   So, in the practical 
case, the Groundwork, as an exercise in the general metaphysics of morals, tells us that 
freedom is a lawful order, subject not to the law of natural causality but the law of 
rational causality, the moral law.  More specifically, in the guise of the Categorical 
Imperative, it tells us that free actions (or their maxims) must be universal, rightly 
related to rational nature, and consistent with the autonomy of the will.   But it does not 
tell us which actions (or their maxims) meet these conditions.15  In order to cognize this 
further fact—and so, in order to cognize not just the lawfulness of freedom but 
freedom’s laws—we must supplement the purely a priori general metaphysics with an 
impurely a priori special one, realizing or instantiating the former in the latter.  It is 
here, and only here, that we move beyond the possibility of ethical science to its actual 
practice.16  
  To wit, trying to do ethics with just the Groundwork is like trying to do physics 
with just the first Critique.  It can’t be done.  But it’s not supposed to be done.  The real 
scientific work happens only in the sequel.17 
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V 
Now, as I noted in my earlier treatment of the Metaphysical Foundations, the body 
of that work is concerned with Kant’s detailed discussion of how to transition from 
general to special metaphysics.  As he puts it in the Preface, he will do this by bringing 
“all determinations of the general concept of a matter in general” under “the four 
classes of [pure concepts of the understanding],” expounded in the first Critique (MAN 
4:474-5).  Given this, one might well expect the body of the Metaphysics of Morals to 
consist of parallel arguments, in which all determinations of the general concept of a 
human action in general are brought under the various formulations of the Categorical 
Imperative expounded in the Groundwork or, perhaps, the corresponding categories of 
freedom, expounded in the second Critique.  And yet, this is not exactly what one finds.  
First, Kant does not appear to explicate the concept of human action in the detailed way 
he explicates the concept of matter.  And second, Kant does not appear to bring this 
concept of human action, such as it is, under the Categorical Imperative or the 
categories of freedom, at least not in anything like the explicit and systematic way he 
does in the Metaphysical Foundations.  So, it remains obscure how exactly he intends, as 
he puts it, to “show in [the practical nature of human beings] what can be inferred from 
universal moral principles” (MS 6:216-7).  That said, it is not difficult to interpret the 
Metaphysics of Morals as at least attempting such an inference.  Here is a sketch of how 
this might go.18  
 Start with the universal moral principles, which are disclosed by the general 
metaphysics of morals, executed in the Groundwork.  As I have already said, I think 
these principles—which, I take it, are meant to encompass the various statements of the 
one supreme principle, the moral law—tell us, in sum, that freedom is a lawful order.  
This certainly seems at the fore in Kant’s initial statement of the principle, in terms of 
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universal law.  But, of course, Kant does not stop there.  He continues to spell out the 
principle in new terms, inviting us to think not just about its content—universality—but 
the authority that grounds it—rational nature as an end-in-itself—as well the ultimate 
explanation of this authority—autonomy—which reveals that in acting in accord with 
the principle, a rational being is simply acting in accord with her own rational nature.  
This last point is, I think, the most important.  For it makes plain what seems to me the 
upshot of the Groundwork, which is that all morality asks of a rational being—indeed, all 
it could ask of a rational being—is for that being to be itself, to express in action what it 
truly is.  Or, to put the point in imperatival terms, what the Groundwork really tells us is 
that rational beings ought always to act in ways that protect and promote rational 
functioning, their own and others’. 
 Suppose this is right.  It would tell us something important about morality.  But 
it would not yet tell us what morality would bid us do.  That is, it would not yet tell us 
which ways of acting actually protect or promote rational functioning, not in us and not 
in any other kind of rational being.  In order to know this further fact, we must fix the kind 
of rational being in question.  Only when we know what it is for beings of this kind to 
act—and, in particular, how their acting bears, constitutively and instrumentally, on 
their rational functioning—can we know how it is they should act.   
 Put another way, the moral story told by the Groundwork does not determine 
duties, human or otherwise, but only sets the correct parameters for determining duties, 
human or otherwise, by telling us which features of a being are relevant to such 
determination, viz., those features that bear on its rational functioning.  The Metaphysics 
of Morals, as I read it, is Kant’s attempt to apply such parameters in the case of 
specifically human beings.  It is, to that extent, an anthropocentric specification of the 
generic rational end of rational functioning.19  
20 
 Now, judging from the structure of the Metaphysics of Morals, it seems that the 
first fundamental fact about human action that Kant emphasizes is that such action 
admits of a distinction between outer and inner, external and internal.20,21  By this he 
seems to mean that human actions can be considered in two respects: with respect to 
their worldly existence and effects and with respect to their psychological causes or 
determining grounds.  Consequently, human action is subject to two kinds of 
evaluation, one keyed to the external, abstracted from the internal, and one keyed to the 
internal, abstracted from the external.  This is (more or less) the principle by which Kant 
divides the Metaphysics of Morals into two parts: the Doctrine of Right, concerned with 
external evaluation, and the Doctrine of Virtue, concerned with internal evaluation. 
 So, as Kant says in the Introduction to the Doctrine of Right, the concept of right 
has to do “only with the external and indeed practical relation of one person to another, 
insofar as their actions, as deeds, can have (direct or indirect) influence on each other” 
(MS 6:230).  Such influence matters morally because, again, it bears on our rational 
functioning.  This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the body.  The fundamental 
way in which we humans function as rational agents in the world—and, moreover, the 
fundamental way in which we can affect each other’s rational functioning—is through 
the use of our bodies.  Thus, Kant thinks, morality, which is protective of rational 
functioning, must protect our use of our bodies, a protection captured by Kant’s 
account of our one innate right, the right to freedom.  Add that we can act in the world 
through the use of other bodies too, both of persons and things, and we get the 
categories of acquired right: property, contract, and status.  Taken together, these rights 
delimit spheres of effective agency among embodied beings occupying a common 
world. 
 Where the Doctrine of Right cares simply about what we do, the Doctrine of 
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Virtue cares also about why we do it.  This brings the internal aspect of action into view, 
and so, on Kant’s account, the ends to which our actions are directed.  Thus, Kant 
thinks, a morality concerned with rational functioning must prescribe ends, the pursuit 
of which allows us to see ourselves as effectively realizing that functioning.  Such a 
prescription is captured, for example, by Kant’s account of the obligatory ends.  As I 
understand it, this account starts from a view of human nature in which the pursuit of 
happiness—the ordered achievement of our various natural ends—is the prime venue 
for the development of rational agency.  Though we do not originally pursue happiness 
in order to develop ourselves, it is through the pursuit of happiness that we do in fact 
develop ourselves.  Thus, morality does not tell us to abandon happiness but to 
transform it so that what makes us happy also makes us good, in the sense of rational 
well-functioning.  The two obligatory ends mark the different ways of achieving this 
aim in the case of self and other.22 
 There is, of course, much more to say.  In distinguishing the external and internal 
aspects of action, in emphasizing our embodiment and our orientation toward 
happiness, Kant has moved down a level of abstraction.  Over the course of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, he will want to move down further still, exploring increasingly 
determinate conceptions of human practical nature and showing how they bear on 
rational functioning.23  This is evident, for example, in his clear concern with the fact 
that the conditions of our happiness are deeply social.  As he says, “only in comparison 
with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy,” a comparison that is itself 
mediated by others’ opinion of one’s worth (R 6:26-27).24  This obviously complicates 
the way in which the pursuit of happiness can be rationalized, opening up both pro-
moral (egalitarian) and anti-moral (inegalitarian) possibilities.  And so it should be no 
surprise that much of Kant’s discussion in the Doctrine of Virtue is dedicated toward 
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managing just these complications, as in his discussion of the duties of love and 
respect—e.g., beneficence, gratitude, etc.—and the various vices that oppose them—
e.g., envy, arrogance, etc.     
 Now, describing all of these arguments and, especially, showing how they might 
be systematized, is a large project, which I cannot begin to undertake here.  I offer this 
sketch simply as a proof of concept: to show how the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of 
Morals could be understood as executing the two-stage metaphysics I describe, and so 
how the latter might be thought to realize or instantiate the principles of the former by 
providing an account of human rational functioning. 
 
VI 
We can see, then, that despite his reputation as arch rationalist, Kant actually 
thinks that rational and empirical elements are intimately related in the metaphysics of 
morals, a relation that should serve to transform our understanding of both.  First and 
most obviously, our understanding of the rational is transformed because it is clear that 
reason’s function, though fundamental, is limited.  It sets us a task that we must go 
beyond reason to complete.  For again, though reason itself delivers the generic rational 
end of rational functioning, it does not specify the content of this end and so what any 
(kind of) rational being must do in order to realize it.  For that, we must make recourse 
to an empirical concept of a particular kind of rational being, and so, in our case, the 
human being.   
To this extent, Kant is perhaps less of a rationalist than typically thought.  But in 
another sense, he is perhaps more of a rationalist, insofar as the rational elements of 
metaphysics in fact shape the empirical elements, and so our conception of human 
nature.  Again, empirical, anthropological considerations do not have independent 
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standing in the theory.  They have what standing they do because they are brought into 
the remit of the rational in the way I have described.  Consequently, as I put it earlier, 
though the pure moral law does not itself determine duties, it sets the correct 
parameters for determining duties by telling us which features of a being are relevant to 
such determination, viz., those features that bear, instrumentally and constitutively, on 
its rational functioning.  But if that’s right, then it should be obvious that, though we 
must make recourse to an empirical concept of the human being, not just any such 
concept will do.   
We can make the point by distinguishing a theoretical and a practical concept of 
the human being, that is, a concept of the human being as it figures in theoretical 
philosophy and a concept of the human being as it figures in practical philosophy.  To 
be clear, this distinction concerns the function of the concept, not its content, though the 
function will have implications for its content.  In the present context, since the function 
of the concept of the human being as it figures in the metaphysics of morals is to specify the 
conditions of specifically human rational functioning, only certain features of the 
human being will be relevant to the function and so possible elements of its content.  
More specifically, features of the human being that bear on its rational functioning are 
in, and features of the human being that do not bear on its rational functioning are out.  
Thus, we might say, though the content of the concept of the human being is 
empirical—we must observe the human to discern its specific features—the practical 
function of the concept establishes a priori constraints on that content.  
The point can be easy to miss, since Kant himself thinks there is substantial 
overlap between the theoretical and practical concepts of the human being.  Or, at least, 
he thinks there is, if one thinks of the human being, like other parts of living nature, 
teleologically rather than mechanistically.25  Indeed, he argues in a number of places 
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that the natural (biological) purpose of the human is the development of its rational 
capacities, at least at the level of the species (G 4:395-6, IAG 8:18-19).  So, rational 
functioning figures prominently in both the theoretical and practical concepts. 
To make the distinction and its significance more evident, it helps to shift from 
Kant’s biology to our own.  For example, the fact that the quality of human reasoning is 
dependent on testimony, and so on reliable channels of communication, does directly 
bear on our rational functioning and will plausibly figure in the practical concept of the 
human being;26 while the fact that such dependency is realized in certain neural 
structures, determined by certain genetic sequences, reflecting a certain evolutionary 
history does not so bear, at least not as such, and so will plausibly not figure in that 
concept.  Of course, these facts may well figure in a theoretical concept of the human 
being, one that represents the human as just another natural object.  But that is just the 
point.  The practical concept and the theoretical concept, though both empirical, may 
differ in their content because they differ in their function.  They play different roles in 
different kinds of philosophical projects.27   
Thus, though Kant thinks that the practical philosopher must make essential use 
of an empirical concept of the human being, he is not, as one might think, proposing 
that she simply open a biology textbook and import what she finds.  Such information 
will certainly be of interest to her, insofar as it sheds light on the range of human 
powers and their material conditions; but she will always interpret the information with 
an eye to its relation to rational functioning.  For again, her concern with human nature 
is not a theoretical one.  It is a practical one, structured by the moral metaphysical 
project of which it is a part.   
To this extent, we can say that our account of rational nature, as it figures in the 
first stage of metaphysics, actually shapes our account of human nature, as it figures in 
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the second.  For whatever our best biology reveals about the human, we know, as a 
moral metaphysical fact, that the human being is a kind of rational being.  And it is this 
knowledge that guides our investigation into just what this kind is: the specific nature 
of the human being determined by its distinctive, empirically discernable ways of 
rational functioning. 28,29 
 
VII  
My aim in this paper has been to argue that the second principles of Kantian 
ethics, no less than the first, belong to the metaphysics of morals, and that this matters.  
I have done this by taking seriously the metaphysics of the metaphysics of morals—
more specifically, by understanding the metaphysics of morals alongside the 
metaphysics of nature.  For, qua metaphysics, both employ a common two-stage 
methodology, in which both rational and empirical elements play essential roles.  As I 
have explained, appreciating this common methodology sheds new light on how the 
second principles are to be established, as well as the reach of Kant’s rationalism, 
especially as regards our knowledge of human nature.   
Given the size of the topic, my remarks here have been largely programmatic.   If 
successful, I have set the ground for a new way of thinking about the foundations of 
Kantian ethics.  It remains to be seen, however, whether anything worthwhile can be 
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1 See, for example, Barbara Herman’s remark:  “Morality requires an a priori foundation that can only be 
had in the principles of pure practical reason: the Moral Law….The application of the Moral Law cannot 
be carried out, however, without empirical knowledge of the object of application” (Herman 1993, 232, 
her emphasis).  This is a dominant theme in her work.  See Herman 1993 and Herman 2007, as well as 
Korsgaard 1996, O’Neill 1989, Rawls 2000, and Wood 1999 and 2008. 
2 I am not the first to note that Kant counts these principles as metaphysical.  See, for example, Allison 
2011, Gregor 1963, Louden 2000, Siep 2009, and Wood 1999, 2002, 2008.  I am not even the first to note the 
analogy between theoretical and practical metaphysics; Allison, Gregor, and Wood do, at least.  But, so 
far as I know, I am the first to develop the analogy in detail and draw lessons for ethics. 
3 The connection between necessity, universality, and a priority is elaborated at KrV B4.  Kant often infers 
a priority from necessity and universality, in both theoretical and practical cases. 
4 That freedom is a lawful domain is, Kant supposes, a bit of common sense, belonging to the “common 
idea of duty and moral laws” (G 4:389) and “the concept of morality” (G 4:408)—which is not to say that it 
does not admit of philosophical defense.  The same can be said, of course, of the claim that nature is a 
lawful domain, a point to which I shall return. 
5 Such characterizations are suggested at G 4:410n and VMM 29:599.  See Louden 2000 for discussion. 
6 Kant does sometimes refer in the Preface to another kind of non-metaphysical application: the 
application of laws to cases.  Like implementational application, this casuistical application requires 
experience (G 4:389).  And like implementational application, it presupposes the metaphysical application 
on which I focus here.  (One must already have laws in order to apply them to cases.)  Consequently, I set 
it aside.  
7 This seems to be the view of L. Nandi Theunissen, leading her to conclude that the Metaphysics of Morals, 
insofar as it is concerned with such application, is not actually a metaphysics of morals at all (Theunissen 
2013). This is an unwelcome conclusion.  My argument allows us to avoid it.   
8 For invaluable discussion of these points and the work as a whole, see Friedman 2013. 
9 I say “very roughly” because while Kant’s second law (inertia) and third law (equality of action and 
reaction) closely resemble Newton’s first and third laws, Kant’s first law (conservation of matter) doesn’t 
appear among Newton’s laws and Newton’s second law (F=ma) doesn’t appear among Kant’s. 
10 Cf. Kant’s comment that “a separated metaphysics of corporeal nature does excellent and indispensable 
service for general metaphysics, in that the former furnishes examples (instances in concreto) in which to 
realize the concepts and propositions of the latter (properly speaking, transcendental philosophy), that is, 
to give a mere form of thought sense and meaning” (MAN 4:478, Kant’s emphasis).   
29 
 
11 Why is the relevant empirical concept a concept of a particular kind of action?  Because Kant is engaged in 
practical philosophy, the proper object of which must be practical.  As Kant says, “the free act of choice” is 
“the highest divided concept” of a metaphysics of morals (MS 6:218, his emphasis).  It is to practical 
philosophy what “an object in general” is to theoretical philosophy (ibid).  Thus, just as the relevant 
empirical concept in theoretical metaphysics must be a concept of a particular kind of (natural) object, so 
must the relevant empirical concept in practical metaphysics be a concept of a particular kind of (free) 
action.  That said, I will follow Kant in sometimes referring to the concept of a kind of agent (e.g., the 
human being) rather than the concept of a kind of action (e.g., human action).  I take it that we are 
interested in the former only because we are interested in the latter.  As I shall explain in §VI, this has 
important implications for the kind of concept of the human being that is relevant to moral metaphysics. 
12 Why is the relevant empirical concept one of specifically human action?  Because we are interested in the 
specifically human case.  If we were interested in non-human (e.g., Martian) cases, then we would make 
use of a concept of non-human (e.g., Martian) action.  Thus, though there is but one general metaphysics 
of morals, there could be as many special metaphysics of morals as there are kinds of action.  Kant is, to 
this extent, a moral pluralist. 
13 Notably, even in the Groundwork Kant analogizes his task there to that of the transcendental logic of the 
first Critique, which, as I have explained, belongs to the general metaphysics of nature (G 4:390; cf. KpV 
5:90).  Where the latter lays out the principles of pure thinking, the former lays out the principles of pure 
willing.    
14 Cf. Kant’s comment that the special metaphysics of nature serves to “give a mere form of thought sense 
and meaning” (MAN 4:478) 
15 That said, the Categorical Imperative might still rule things out.  Plausibly, this is what failure of a 
maxim under universalization is meant to show.  The contradiction is not logical but metaphysical.  A 
maxim that cannot be universalized is like a rule that posits an uncaused cause: neither can serve as a law 
of its domain.  But again, this tells us nothing about what the laws actually are.    
16 This way of relating the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals is similar to the one described by 
Allen W. Wood (Wood 1999, Wood 2002, Wood 2008).  But where Wood more or less just accepts this as 
Kant’s mature view—“the final form of Kant’s practical philosophy,” as he puts it—I think the analogy 
between theoretical and practical metaphysics allows us to give a rationale for it.  Moreover, by doing so, 
I think we can say a bit more about the relation between the first principle (established in the Groundwork) 
and the second (established in the Metaphysics of Morals).  Wood describes the relation between these as 
“hermeneutical” or “interpretive” (Wood 1996, 154; Wood 2008, 60).  While I am not confident that I 
understand what he means by this, I think the instantiation/realization model drawn from the theoretical 
case at least suggests something different and perhaps more rigorous.  I offer a preliminary sketch of this 
relation in the next section. 
17 Thus, the Categorical Imperative really is empty, just as generations of critics have claimed.  But this is 
not really a criticism, since the generative moral work does not belong to the general metaphysics of the 
Groundwork but to the special metaphysics of the Metaphysics of Morals.   
18 Needless to say, all the details here are controversial. 
19 In this respect, Kant’s way of determining duties seems to have more in common with typically 
Aristotelian approaches than with typically Kantian ones, which try to make the Categorical Imperative—
usually the Formula of Universal Law but also the Formula of Humanity—do too much work.  
  In contrast with the Aristotelian, though, Kant begins at a higher level of abstraction, with 
rational functioning rather than human functioning.  On the difference between these approaches, see 
Thompson 2008. I think Thompson overstates the difference, in part because he overlooks the points I 
make here about the stages of metaphysics, but he is right about their divergent starting points.  The 
Kantian work that seems to me closest to the present proposal is Herman 2021.   
20 Though this may be essential to human action, it is plausibly not distinctive of it.  Indeed, the concept of 
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human action and the various concepts of non-human action may well have much in common, at least 
with respect to their more general features.  To this extent, even a Martian Metaphysics of Morals might 
include something quite like a Doctrine of Right and a Doctrine of Virtue, though the details will differ 
depending on more particular features of the agents and their actions, e.g., the ways in which they are 
vulnerable to each other, both physically and psychologically. 
21 Interestingly, this distinction in aspects of action seems to mirror the distinction between inner and 
outer, between extended being and thinking being, that Kant makes use of in the Metaphysical 
Foundations.  In a way, then, we can see Kant as claiming that while the special metaphysics of nature can 
only treat extended rather than thinking nature, the special metaphysics of morals can treat the human 
being at least, considered both as extended and as thinking, though only for practical purposes of course.   
 Note also that Kant actually makes use of the Third Law of Mechanics, part of the special 
metaphysics of nature, in his explication of the concept of right in the Doctrine of Right.  He claims to 
provide, as it were, “the construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori, 
by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action 
and reaction” (MS 6:233, his emphasis).  See the Appendix of Ripstein 2009 for discussion. 
22 Why the difference?  In brief: because the relation we bear to our own rational functioning is different 
from the relation we bear to others’.  In my own case, it is direct, in that what I do in pursuit of my 
happiness can actually constitute my rational well-functioning.  In the case of others, it is indirect, in that 
what I do in pursuit of your happiness only contributes to your rational well-functioning.  More simply, 
your acting well is not something I can do.  At best, I can help you act well by helping you pursue your 
happiness. 
23 This too has analogies on the theoretical side, where Kant begins with a very abstract account of matter 
as the movable in space but, over the course of the Metaphysical Foundations, makes the concept more and 
more empirically determinate. 
24 In the Religion, this falls under “the predisposition to humanity” (R 6:26-27).  See also the discussion of 
unsocial sociability in “Idea for a Universal Purpose with a Cosmopolitan Aim” and of the passions in the 
Anthropology.  It’s worth recalling in this context that Kant early on identifies Rousseau, whose account of 
amour-propre is clearly the ancestor of all this, as the Newton of human nature.  Wood, especially, has 
emphasized the importance of this material to understanding Kant’s ethics (Wood 1999, Part II).  For 
illuminating discussion of Rousseau on amour-propre, which may be useful for filling in some of the gaps 
in Kant’s account, see Neuhouser 2008. 
25 That we must think of living beings teleologically is one of the main theses of the third Critique. 
26 Something like this thought underlies Kant’s discussion of lying in the Metaphysics of Morals (MS 6:429). 
27 Kant himself makes something like this point, dismissing an account of memory in terms of “cranial 
nerves and fibers” not because it is false but because it is irrelevant; it contributes to a “physiological” 
account of human nature—"what nature makes of the human being”—but not a “pragmatic” account—
“what [the human] as a free-acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself” (A 7:119, 
Kant’s emphasis).  What he is here calling a “pragmatic” account is roughly what I am calling a practical 
one.   
28 Though Kant was of course innocent of evolution, the autonomy, so to speak, of the practical concept is 
obviously of importance in thinking through the challenge that evolutionary theory presents to 
traditional accounts of human nature.  I hope to discuss the practical concept and the evolutionary 
challenge more thoroughly in other work. 
29 In this, I appear to disagree with Wood, who thinks that the relevant account of human nature is and 
can only be theoretical, understanding “humanity as a biological species in the same way other animals 
are to be understood” (Wood 1999, 207).  Wood seems to think that this must be the case, lest one be 
involved in a vicious circularity, since “the ends of morality are first to be determined by applying the 
principle of morality to practical anthropology.  So at this stage of inquiry they are not yet available to 
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anthropological research” (ibid, 219).  If by “ends of morality” Wood means here the obligatory ends, as 
elements of the special metaphysics, he is no doubt right.  But there is an “end of morality” that is prior to 
this, the generic rational end of rational functioning, that belongs to the general metaphysics.  I don’t see 
how appealing to this end, as an a priori constraint on the concept of human nature at issue, need involve 
any circularity at all.   For further discussion of Kant’s views on human nature, see Louden 2000 and 
2011, Brian and Jacobs 2003, and Frierson 2013. 
30 Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the UCLA History Workshop and the North American 
Kant Society Pacific Study Group.  I thank the audiences there for questions and comments.  I also thank 
Barbara Herman, Gavin Lawrence, John Carriero, Andy Reath, Jim Kreines, Patricio Fernandez, and Jorah 
Dannenberg for helpful discussion.   
